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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 94-367
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GEORGE W. HEINTZ, et al., PETITIONERS v.
DARLENE JENKINS
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the seventh circuit
[April 18, 1995]

  Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The issue before us is whether the term -debt collec-
tor- in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 91 Stat.
874, 15 U. S. C. 1692-1692o (1988 ed. and Supp. V),
applies to a lawyer who -regularly,- through litigation,
tries to collect consumer debts.  The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that it does.  We agree with
the Seventh Circuit and we affirm its judgment.
  The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits -debt
collector[s]- from making false or misleading representa-
tions and from engaging in various abusive and unfair
practices.  The Act says, for example, that a -debt
collector- may not use violence, obscenity, or repeated
annoying phone calls, 15 U. S. C. 1692d; may not
falsely represent -the character, amount, or legal status
of any debt,- 1692e(2)(A); and may not use various
-unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to
collect- a consumer debt, 1692f.  Among other things,
the Act sets out rules that a debt collector must follow
for -acquiring location information- about the debtor,
1692b; communicating about the debtor (and the debt)
with third parties, 1692c(b); and bringing -[l]egal
actions,- 1692i.  The Act imposes upon -debt collec-
tor[s]- who violate its provisions (specifically described)
-[c]ivil liability- to those whom they, e.g., harass,
mislead, or treat unfairly.  1692k.  The Act also
authorizes the Federal Trade Commission to enforce its
provisions.  1692l(a).  The Act's definition of the term
-debt collector- includes a person -who regularly collects
or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed
[to] . . . another.-  1692a(6).  And, it limits -debt- to
consumer debt, i.e., debts -arising out of . . . transac-
tion[s]- that -are primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes.-  1692a(5).
  The plaintiff in this case, Darlene Jenkins, borrowed
money from the Gainer Bank in order to buy a car.  She
defaulted on her loan.  The bank's law firm then sued
Jenkins in state court to recover the balance due.  As
part of an effort to settle the suit, a lawyer with that
law firm, George Heintz, wrote to Jenkins.  His letter,
in listing the amount she owed under the loan agree-
ment, included $4,173 owed for insurance, bought by the
bank because she had not kept the car insured as she
had promised to do.
  Jenkins then brought this Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act suit against Heintz and his firm.  She
claimed that Heintz's letter violated the Act's prohibi-
tions against trying to collect an amount not -authorized
by the agreement creating the debt,- 1692f(1), and
against making a -false representation of . . . the . . .
amount . . . of any debt,- 1692e(2)(A).  The loan
agreement, she conceded, required her to keep the car
insured -against loss or damage- and permitted the bank
to buy such insurance to protect the car should she fail
to do so.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 17.  But, she said, the
$4,137 substitute policy was not the kind of policy the
loan agreement had in mind, for it insured the bank not
only against -loss or damage- but also against her
failure to repay the bank's car loan.  Hence, Heintz's
-representation- about the -amount- of her -debt- was
-false-; amounted to an effort to collect an -amount- not
-authorized- by the loan agreement; and thus violated
the Act.
  Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the District Court dismissed Jenkins's Fair
Debt Collection lawsuit for failure to state a claim.  The
court held the Act does not apply to lawyers engaging in
litigation.  However, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment,
interpreting the Act to apply to litigating lawyers.
Jenkins v. Heintz, 25 F. 3d 536 (1994).  The Seventh
Circuit's view in this respect conflicts with that of the
Sixth Circuit.  See Green v. Hocking, 9 F. 3d 18 (1993)
(per curiam).  We granted certiorari to resolve this
conflict.  513 U. S. ____ (1994).  And, as we have said,
we conclude that the Seventh Circuit is correct.  The Act
does apply to lawyers engaged in litigation.
  There are two rather strong reasons for believing that
the Act applies to the litigating activities of lawyers.
First, the Act defines the -debt collector[s]- to whom it
applies as including those who -regularly collec[t] or
attemp[t] to collect, directly or indirectly, [consumer]
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another.-  1692a(6).  In ordinary English, a lawyer who
regularly tries to obtain payment of consumer debts
through legal proceedings is a lawyer who regularly
-attempts- to -collect- those consumer debts.  See, e.g.,
Black's Law Dictionary 263 (6th ed. 1990) (-To collect a
debt or claim is to obtain payment or liquidation of it,
either by personal solicitation or legal proceedings-).
  Second, in 1977, Congress enacted an earlier version
of this statute, which contained an express exemption
for lawyers.  That exemption said that the term -debt
collector- did not include -any attorney-at-law collecting
a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of
a client.-  Pub. L. 95-109, 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. 874, 875.
In 1986, however, Congress repealed this exemption in
its entirety, Pub. L. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768, without
creating a narrower, litigation-related, exemption to fill
the void.  Without more, then, one would think that
Congress intended that lawyers be subject to the Act
whenever they meet the general -debt collector- defini-
tion.
  Heintz argues that we should nonetheless read the
statute as containing an implied exemption for those
debt-collecting activities of lawyers that consist of
litigating (including, he assumes, settlement efforts).  He
relies primarily on three arguments.
  First, Heintz argues that many of the Act's require-
ments, if applied directly to litigating activities, will
create harmfully anomalous results that Congress simply
could not have intended.  We address this argument in
light of the fact that, when Congress first wrote the
Act's substantive provisions, it had for the most part
exempted litigating attorneys from the Act's coverage;
that, when Congress later repealed the attorney exemp-
tion, it did not revisit the wording of these substantive
provisions; and that, for these reasons, some awkward-
ness is understandable.  Particularly when read in this
light, we find Heintz's argument unconvincing.
  Many of Heintz's -anomalies- are not particularly
anomalous.  For example, the Sixth Circuit pointed to
1692e(5), which forbids a -debt collector- to make any
-threat to take action that cannot legally be taken.-  The
court reasoned that, were the Act to apply to litigating
activities, this provision automatically would make liable
any litigating lawyer who brought, and then lost, a
claim against a debtor.  Green, supra, at 21.  But, the
Act says explicitly that a -debt collector- may not be
held liable if he -shows by a preponderance of evidence
that the violation was not intentional and resulted from
a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.-
1692k(c).  Thus, even if we were to assume that the
suggested reading of 1692e(5) is correct, we would not
find the result so absurd as to warrant implying an
exemption for litigating lawyers.  In any event, the
assumption would seem unnecessary, for we do not see
how the fact that a lawsuit turns out ultimately to be
unsuccessful could, by itself, make the bringing of it an
-action that cannot legally be taken.-
  The remaining significant -anomalies- similarly depend
for their persuasive force upon readings that courts seem
unlikely to endorse.  For example, Heintz's strongest
-anomaly- argument focuses upon the Act's provisions
governing -[c]ommunication in connection with debt
collection.-  1692c.  One of those provisions requires a
-debt collector- not to -communicate further- with a
consumer who -notifies- the -debt collector- that he or
she -refuses to pay- or wishes the debt collector to
-cease further communication.-  1692c(c).  In light of
this provision, asks Heintz, how can an attorney file a
lawsuit against (and thereby communicate with) a
nonconsenting consumer or file a motion for summary
judgment against that consumer?
  We agree with Heintz that it would be odd if the Act
empowered a debt-owing consumer to stop the -commu-
nications- inherent in an ordinary lawsuit and thereby
cause an ordinary debt-collecting lawsuit to grind to a
halt.  But, it is not necessary to read 1692c(c) in that
way-if only because that provision has exceptions that
permit communications -to notify the consumer that the
debt collector or creditor may invoke- or -intends to
invoke- a -specified remedy- (of a kind -ordinarily
invoked by [the] debt collector or creditor-).
1692c(c)(2), (3).  Courts can read these exceptions,
plausibly, to imply that they authorize the actual
invocation of the remedy that the collector -intends to
invoke.-  The language permits such a reading, for an
ordinary court-related document does, in fact, -notify- its
recipient that the creditor may -invoke- a judicial
remedy.  Moreover, the interpretation is consistent with
the statute's apparent objective of preserving creditors'
judicial remedies.  We need not authoritatively interpret
the Act's conduct-regulating provisions now, however.
Rather, we rest our conclusions upon the fact that it is
easier to read 1692c(c) as containing some such addi-
tional, implicit, exception than to believe that Congress
intended, silently and implicitly, to create a far broader
exception, for all litigating attorneys, from the Act itself.
  Second, Heintz points to a statement of Congressman
Frank Annunzio, one of the sponsors of the 1986
amendment that removed from the Act the language
creating a blanket exemption for lawyers.  Representa-
tive Annunzio stated that, despite the exemption's
removal, the Act still would not apply to lawyers'
litigating activities.  Representative Annunzio said that
the Act
-regulates debt collection, not the practice of law.
Congress repealed the attorney exemption to the act,
not because of attorney[s'] conduct in the courtroom,
but because of their conduct in the backroom.  Only
collection activities, not legal activities, are covered
by the act. . . . The act applies to attorneys when
they are collecting debts, not when they are per-
forming tasks of a legal nature. . . . The act only
regulates the conduct of debt collectors, it does not
prevent creditors, through their attorneys, from
pursuing any legal remedies available to them.-  132
Cong. Rec. 30842 (1986).
This statement, however, does not persuade us.
  For one thing, the plain language of the Act itself says
nothing about retaining the exemption in respect to
litigation.  The line the statement seeks to draw
between -legal- activities and -debt collection- activities
was not necessarily apparent to those who debated the
legislation, for litigating, at first blush, seems simply
one way of collecting a debt.  For another thing, when
Congress considered the Act, other Congressmen ex-
pressed fear that repeal would limit lawyers' -ability to
contact third parties in order to facilitate settlements-
and -could very easily interfere with a client's right to
pursue judicial remedies.-  H. R. Rep. No. 99-405, p. 11
(1985) (dissenting views of Rep. Hiler).  They proposed
alternative language designed to keep litigation activities
outside the Act's scope, but that language was not
enacted.  Ibid.  Further, Congressman Annunzio made
his statement not during the legislative process, but
after the statute became law.  It therefore is not a
statement upon which other legislators might have relied
in voting for or against the Act, but it simply represents
the views of one informed person on an issue about
which others may (or may not) have thought differently.
  Finally, Heintz points to a -Commentary- on the Act
by the Federal Trade Commission's staff.  It says:
-Attorneys or law firms that engage in traditional
debt collection activities (sending dunning letters,
making collection calls to consumers) are covered by
the [Act], but those whose practice is limited to legal
activities are not covered.-  Federal Trade Commis-
sion-Statements of General Policy or Interpretation
Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097, 50100 (1988)
(emphasis added; footnote omitted).
We cannot give conclusive weight to this statement.
The Commentary of which this statement is a part says
that it -is not binding on the Commission or the public.-
Id., at 50101.  More importantly, we find nothing either
in the Act or elsewhere indicating that Congress intended
to authorize the FTC to create this exception from the
Act's coverage-an exception that, for the reasons we
have set forth above, falls outside the range of reason-
able interpretations of the Act's express language.  See,
e.g., Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. ____, ____ (1994) (slip
op., at 6-8); see also Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc.,
15 F. 3d 1507, 1513 (CA9 1994) (FTC staff's statement
conflicts with Act's plain language and is therefore not
entitled to deference); Scott v. Jones, 964 F. 2d 314, 317
(CA4 1992) (same).
  For these reasons, we agree with the Seventh Circuit
that the Act applies to attorneys who -regularly- engage
in consumer-debt-collection activity, even when that
activity consists of litigation.  Its judgment is therefore

                                              Affirmed.